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United Kingdom - Supreme Court 
In Re Sigma Finance Corporation (in administrative receivership) 
and In Re The Insolvency Act 1986 (Conjoined Appeals) 
[2009] UKSC 2 (29 Oct 09) 
Christopher CHEN Chao-hung 
Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University 
 
The case of Sigma Finance Corp1 was about the priority of payment under a Security 
Trust Deed for a structured investment vehicle (SIV). In essence, the key issue in 
the case was about whether debts due within the ‘realisation period’ after the 
occurrence of an ‘enforcement event’ should be paid ahead of other short-term 
creditors.  
The relevant part of clause 7.6 in the Security Trust Deed stated that “ 
… [during] the Realisation Period the Security Trustee shall so far as possible discharge on 
the due dates therefor any Short Term Liabilities falling due for payment during such 
period, using cash or other reliable or maturing Assets of the Issuer.” (emphasis added) 
In the end, the majority of the Supreme Court (led by Lord Mance) held that, upon 
true construction, the trustee was not obliged to pay off debts falling due within 
the realisation period (realisation period debts) ahead of other creditors, while a 
plain reading of the texts above seemed to suggest that realisation period debts 
should be paid first.  
While the case rests on the technical reading of the Security Trust Deed, the 
approaches of the court to construe a contractual document in the context of 
security trust deed for an SIV and a medium term notes programme (MTN 
programme) worth some further consideration. The way the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Security Trust Deed might potentially influence many other issues 
with similar wording in relevant trust deeds in the aftermath of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers over a year ago. 
 
                                                 
1 [2009] UKSC 2. 
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In Re Sigma Finance Corp, the Lords agreed to apply the principles of construction 
laid down in Investor Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society2. 
Therefore, the legal issue is: how to ascertain “the meaning which the document 
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which 
would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they 
were at the time of the contract”3 In this case, it was agreed that the wordings in 
the Security Trust Deed should not be read too literally.4 As Lord Collins observed, 
“[a]n over-literal interpretation of one provision without regard to the whole may 
distort or frustrate commercial purpose.”5  
In the present case, the problem was how the court should construct the objective 
meaning of clause 7.6 conveyed to a reasonable person in the context of an SIV? 
There are a few ‘background knowledge’ that worth consideration. First, it is well 
noted that documentation for structured financial instruments could be 
prohibitively long and complex. In UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AGI6, Lord Collins 
noted that “[t]he contractual documentation [of collateralised debt obligations] in 
this matter consists of more than 500 pages and its size and complexity, which is 
no doubt duplicated in many other transactions, make it easier to understand, if 
not to excuse, why senior banking figures (but not necessarily in this case) had little 
understanding of this market and of the risks their institutions were undertaking.”7 
This offered the background for contract drafting and negotiation in the context of 
structured products. 
Secondly, it is a common practice to create a security trustee to hold collateral and 
to protect interests of debenture holders when issuing debt securities.8 The 
Security Trust Deed is the document to create the trust and to define the rights and 
obligations of all relevant parties. It would form a complete set of documentation 
along with other documents, including prospectus, term sheet, terms and 
conditions of the debt securities, etc. Given the products issued and the 
transactions done by an SIV, there are several interested parties in the Security 
Trust Deed. Unfortunately, any interpretation might influence different creditors 
or interested parties, who might not have a chance to negotiate the deed or even 
read it before purchasing a product issued by an SIV. In the case of issuance under 
                                                 
2 [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912-913 (per Lord Hoffmann). 
3 Id. at 912 (per Lord Hoffmann). 
4 [2009] UKSC 2, at [9] (per Lord Mance), at [35] (per Lord Collins), at [40] (per Lord Walker). 
5 Id. at [35]. 
6 [2009] EWCA Civ 585. 
7 Id. at [2]. 
8 Tan Cheng Han (ed), Walter Woon on Company Law (3rd rev edn Sweet & Maxwell, Singapore 2009) 13.12. 
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a multi-issue medium-term notes programme, investors of a later issue under the 
same programme might only accept the terms in the security trust deed without an 
opportunity to bargain. How to determine ‘the meaning which the document 
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge’ would 
be a much complicated task in the context. The conflict of interests between 
different creditors would be influenced greatly by different ways to interpret a 
contractual document, as was shown in Re Sigma Finance Corp. Eventually it 
depends on where this ‘reasonable man’ should stand. 
In this backdrop, the ‘matrix of fact’ behind a transaction would not be useful to 
determine the true meaning of a contact. Instead, the task facing a judge is to 
figure out the best possible meaning within the four corners of relevant contractual 
documentation in order to settle the interests of different interested parties. As 
Lord Collins recognized in his concurring judgment, “[t]he Security Trust Deed 
secures a variety of creditors … issued at different times, and in different 
circumstances.”9 Thus, Lord Collins suggested that “this is not the type of case 
where the background or matrix of fact is or ought to be relevant … [T]here is 
much assistance to be derived from the principles of interpretation re-stated by 
Lord Hoffmann …”10 Thus, “[t]he instrument must be interpreted as a whole in 
light of the commercial intention which may inferred from the fact of the 
instrument and from the nature of the debtor’s business.”11 
Based on this understanding, we may further deconstruct the approaches taken by 
the Lords in the case. The majority of the court’s approach was to ascertain “the 
meaning that the Deed would convey to a reasonable person with the relevant 
background knowledge” in the context of the overall scheme created by clause 7 of 
the Security Trust Deed.12 One factor underlying Lord Mance’s judgment is that 
clause 7 of the Security Trust Deed does not hinge upon the insolvency of Sigma 
Finance Corp13; and the wording of clause 7.6 suggested that the Deed intended to 
create different pools of assets to deal with short-term and long-term creditors as 
well as equity holders. There is no mention of creating a separate pool for 
‘realisation period debt’. On this basis, Lord Mance argued that accepting priority 
for realisation period debts might be fortuitous and outside the contemplation of 
commercial parties.14 Lord Mance also refused to give a strong meaning to the 
                                                 
9 [2009] UKSC 2, at [35]. 
10 Id. at [36]. 
11 Id. 
12 Re Sigma, at [12]. 
13 Lord Walker also agreed on this point in his dissenting opinion. At [42]. 
14 [2009] UKSC 2, at [21]. However, this point has been countered by Lord Walker at [44]-[45]. 
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words of ‘so far as’ and instead treated them as equating with ‘if’ so that the trustee 
was not obliged to pay off realisation period debts.15 Therefore, Lord Mance held 
that debts due within the realisation period would not have priority of payment 
over other short-term creditors. 
Overall, the interpretation adopted by Lord Mance seems to be plausible. 
However, as suggested by Lord Walker, this case involves no issue of general 
public importance.16 The language used in the Deed is wide enough to cover 
different constructions. Lord Mance (and the majority of the court) seemed to 
place more weight on the commercial consequences of allowing priority for 
realisation period debt, while Lord Walker seemed to prefer a more straightforward 
reading of the contexts. In this sense, the majority of the court attempted to 
rationalise the wording and application of the Security Trust Deed by taking into 
account whether there would be unnecessary consequences in an objective 
standard.  
However, this approach does not necessarily come any closer to examine the true 
intention of parties. It may be down to the point mentioned earlier that there are 
many parties who are influenced by the Security Trust Deed but who do not even 
have a chance to negotiate the terms thereof. Under this circumstance, the purpose 
of ascertaining the intention of parties is doomed to be futile. In the end, it would 
be down to the court to give the deed a proper meaning that the court would 
believe to be reasonable by relevant parties.  
We might see more judges deconstruct complex documentation of financing and 
structured investment products in a more systemic and structural way in order to 
clarify the internal logic of the documentation. For past transactions, liquidators, 
receivers and practitioners are better prepared to rationalised the scheme created in 
any security trust deed as well as other associated documents to convince the court 
to rule in their favour. For future transactions, prospective contract lawyers might 
have to draft carefully and explicitly in order to give realisation period debt priority 
over other liabilities, if that is really what contractual parties mean.  
 
                                                 
15 Id. at [33].  
16 Id. at [39]. 
